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Abstract
Target 16.6 of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) seeks to create ‘effec-
tive, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels’ for the purpose of achiev-
ing sustainable development. Nevertheless, the inherent vagueness of the notions of 
transparency and accountability poses difficulties for achieving the target. This is why 
this article examines how these notions have been conceptualized in international 
legal discourse and applied in practice. It does so within the context of the trade in 
natural resources that finance armed conflict, which is considered detrimental to the 
development opportunities of developing countries. The article examines how two of 
the most important initiatives in this field, namely the Kimberley Process for the Cer-
tification of Rough Diamonds and the oecd Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas, operationalize 
transparency and accountability. It posits that both initiatives fall short of establishing 
full accountability. However, notwithstanding their flaws and limitations, they make a 
valuable contribution to achieving target 16.6.
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In December 19982, a (then) relatively unknown ngo called Global Witness 
issued a report entitled ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Govern-
ments in the Angolan Conflict’, uncovering the role that rough diamonds 
played in fueling the bloody armed conflict in Angola.3 The shock that this 
report caused within the international community spurred several develop-
ments aimed at stopping the trade in so-called conflict resources, namely ‘nat-
ural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade finance or fuel armed 
conflicts’.4 This practice is highly destructive in more than one way. In addi-
tion to prolonging armed violence, the trade in conflict resources also seriously 
hampers the economic opportunities of developing countries, which often are 
highly reliant on these very same natural resources. A 2017 report published 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) in-
dicates that two-thirds of a total of 135 developing countries are dependent on 
commodity exports and this number is on the rise.5 Furthermore, about one 
quarter of these countries, mostly African, depends specifically on minerals, 
1 The Special Issue ‘International Law for the Sustainable Development Goals’ is a research 
outcome of the 2017–2018 Workshop Series ‘International Law for the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals’ organised by the Department of Transboundary Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, 
University of Groningen. Mando Rachovitsa and Marlies Hesselman led the organisation of 
these workshops. The series included 8 workshops, which explored the role and relevance 
of international law to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Spe-
cial Issue includes some of the papers presented at the workshops and papers submitted 
to an open Call for Papers. More information is available at https://www.rug.nl/rechten/
congressen/il4sdgs/.
2 This paper builds on and occasionally borrows from my previous work, most notably Daniël-
la Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, 
‘The Role of Informal Normative Processes in Improving Governance Over Natural Resources 
in Conflict-torn States’, The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 7/2: 219–241 (2015); and Daniëlla 
Dam-de Jong, ‘UN Natural Resources Sanctions Regimes: Incorporating Market-based Re-
sponses to Address Market-driven Problems’ in Larissa van den Herik (ed.), Research Hand-
book on UN Sanctions and International Law (Camberley: Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 147–174.
3 Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Con-
flict, 1 December 1998, available at https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/rough-trade, 
accessed 21 February 2019.
4 See Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources, p. 27. This defini-
tion is proposed in the absence of a formal definition of the term ‘conflict resources’.
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, State of Commodity Dependence 2016, 
unctad/suc/2017/2, 12 December 2017, p. 19.
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ores and metals as a subcategory of natural resources.6 Addressing the trade 
in conflict resources is therefore both a security and a development priority.
The dual objectives of security and development also underlie efforts to ad-
dress the trade in conflict resources. The most important initiatives to curb 
the trade in conflict resources include the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme for Rough Diamonds (kpcs), adopted by States, the diamond industry 
and civil society in 2002, and the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Sup-
ply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas (the oecd 
Guidance), adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (oecd) in 2011. Both initiatives emphasize that their objective is to 
prevent natural resources from contributing to armed conflict and to promote 
sustainable development.7 Their principal method for achieving this is to pro-
tect the legitimate trade in natural resources and to ban illegitimately sourced 
natural resources from the international market. In these ways, the initiatives 
have the potential to make a valuable contribution to the realization of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs), notably to Goal 16 on peace, justice 
and strong institutions.
This Goal does not only generally recognize the inter-linkages between 
peace and development, but also contains several targets to which the ini-
tiatives (can) contribute. This is especially so for target 16.4, which seeks to 
‘significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery 
and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime’.8 Firstly, 
the trade in conflict resources is encompassed by the notion of ‘illicit financial 
flows’, which according to the World Bank refers to ‘cross-border movement 
6 Ibid.
7 See the preamble of the Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme, Core Document, 22 Novem-
ber 2013, available at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/documents under ‘core docu-
ments’, accessed 21 February 2019, which refers to the ‘critical contribution [that the trade 
in diamonds make] to the economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and 
importing states, especially developing states’; Recommendation of the oecd Council on 
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas, C(2012)93, 25 May 2011 (amended on 17 July 2012), which recommends 
that ‘Members and non-Member adherents to the Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises actively promote the observance of the Guidance by compa-
nies operating in or from their territories and sourcing minerals from conflict-affected or 
high-risk areas with the aim of ensuring that they respect human rights, avoid contributing 
to conflict and successfully contribute to sustainable, equitable and effective development’.
8 unga, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 21 
October 2015, p. 25.
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of capital associated with illegal activity’.9 The notion not only encompasses 
the flows themselves, but also the underlying activities that generate the flows, 
including activities such as the smuggling and trafficking of minerals or other 
illegally obtained natural resources.10 In addition, the trade in conflict resourc-
es is strongly connected to illicit arms flows, as encompassed by target 16.4. 
This is explicitly recognized by the kpcs, which states in the preamble that 
‘the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious international concern, 
which can be directly linked to […] the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, 
armaments, especially small arms and light weapons’.11 Furthermore, the trade 
in conflict resources is largely dependent on organized crime. An investiga-
tion led by various international organizations in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (drc), for instance, concluded that around 98% of net profits from 
illegal natural resource exploitation in the drc – particularly gold, charcoal 
and timber – goes to transnational organized criminal networks, while armed 
groups retain only 2% of these profits.12
Given the close connections between the trade in conflict resources and 
target 16.4, it is evident that the kpcs and the oecd Guidance can play an im-
portant role in achieving it. However, these initiatives can also make a valuable 
contribution to achieving other targets within Goal 16 of the 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals. The current article focuses on target 16.6, which seeks 
to create ‘effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels’ for 
the purpose of achieving sustainable development. It is beyond doubt that an 
effective approach towards curbing the international trade in conflict resourc-
es relies to a great extent on the establishment of effective, accountable and 
transparent institutions, which are capable of monitoring the trade in natu-
ral resources. This is precisely what the kpcs and the oecd Guidance seek 
to achieve. At the same time, target 16.6 does not specify what is understood 
by effective, accountable and transparent institutions. This raises important 
questions.
A first concern focuses on institutions. Obviously, public institutions 
play an essential role in curbing the trade in conflict resources. It is first and 
9 World Bank, The World Bank Group’s Response to Illicit Financial Flows: A Stocktaking, 
104568, 22 March 2016, p. 1.
10 Ibid., p. 2.
11 Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme, preamble.
12 unep-monusco-osesg, Experts’ Background Report on Illegal Exploitation and Trade 
in Natural Resources Benefitting Organized Criminal Groups and Recommendations on 
monusco’s Role in Fostering Stability and Peace in Eastern DR Congo, Final report, 15 April 
2015, https://www.unenvironment.org, accessed 21 February 2019.
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foremost up to governments to establish and administer regulatory systems 
aimed at preventing illegal trade in natural resources. Yet, the private sector 
plays a pivotal role as well. This can be illustrated with reference to the oecd 
Guidance, which focuses precisely on enhancing the resilience of corporate 
control systems as a means to prevent corporations from contributing to the 
trade in conflict resources. The question can therefore be raised whether the 
private sector is encompassed by the notion ‘institutions’ as envisaged by tar-
get 16.6. The current article argues in favor of adopting an inclusive interpre-
tation. Arguably, this position is supported by the sustainable development 
agenda itself, which specifically envisages a role for the private sector to con-
tribute towards the realization of the sdgs as part of the Global Partnership for 
sustainable development.13
Other questions concern the understanding of the notions ‘transparency’ 
and ‘accountability’, which constitute the primary object of inquiry in this ar-
ticle. In this respect, it is relevant to note that both the kpcs and the oecd 
Guidance rely on transparency and accountability as tools to strengthen in-
stitutions. The kpcs focuses primarily on governmental institutions and the 
oecd Guidance on corporate structures and processes. The principal ques-
tion that is to be addressed in this article is therefore how these two initia-
tives operationalize transparency and accountability within their respective 
frameworks. The purpose of this inquiry is to shed light on how the initiatives 
contribute to achieving target 16.6 of the sdgs within the specific context of 
curbing illicit financial flows, as encompassed by target 16.4.
For this purpose, the discussion first provides a theoretical framework 
for assessing the transparency and accountability requirements in the two 
initiatives. It inquires how transparency and accountability have been concep-
tualized in international legal discourse and how the two notions are inter-
connected (section 2). The international legal framework is considered most 
relevant, because the kpcs and the oecd Guidance have an important norma-
tive function, notwithstanding the fact that these are strictly speaking not part 
of formal international law. The normative function of the two instruments is 
addressed in the following section. More specifically, section 3 examines the 
objectives, scope, norm creators and addressees of the two instruments for the 
purpose of clarifying the institutional setting in which the transparency and 
accountability standards operate. It subsequently addresses the mechanisms 
on which these instruments rely to operationalize transparency and account-
ability. Furthermore, promoting transparency and accountability in itself does 
not necessarily result in transparent and accountable institutions, as proposed 
13 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, para. 39.
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by target 16.6. The current contribution also inquires into the underlying pur-
poses of the transparency and accountability standards designed by the two 
initiatives (section  4). Finally, the analysis relates the operation of the stan-
dards within these two instruments to the objectives of sdg 16.6 (section 5).
2 A Conceptual Exploration of Transparency and Accountability
In order to assess how the two initiatives operationalize transparency and ac-
countability and thereby contribute to achieving target 16.6, this section aims 
to develop a general understanding of the notions of transparency and ac-
countability. Sub-section  2.1 explores the notion of transparency, while sub-
section 2.2 focuses on accountability. Sub-section 2.3 clarifies the connections 
between transparency and accountability and briefly discusses how these will 
be assessed in the context of the kpcs and the oecd Guidance. The current 
section does not elaborate on the question of the addressees of transparency 
and accountability norms. It takes as its starting-point that existing transpar-
ency and accountability standards are primarily addressed to public authori-
ties (States and, to a lesser extent, international organizations), but that similar 
standards have been developed as a matter of soft law for private actors (ngos 
and corporations) as well.14 Of course, both standards are closely related to 
the notion of good governance, which includes, in addition to transparency 
and accountability, standards such as abiding by the rule of law and public 
participation.15
2.1 Transparency
Demands for greater transparency have permeated contemporary debates on 
governance in all fields, ranging from environmental protection to the more 
classical domain of peace and security, and with respect to a great variety of 
14 See, e.g., Larry Backer, ‘Transparency and Business in International Law: Governance be-
tween Norm and Technique’ in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds.), Transparency in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 477–501.
15 See, e.g., Thomas Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Con-
ceptual and Actual Challenges’, Third World Quarterly, 21/5: 795–814 (2000); Andy Knight, 
‘Democracy and Good Governance’ in Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 620–633; 
Edith Brown-Weiss and Ahila Sornarajah, ‘Good Governance’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), vol. iv, 
pp. 516–528; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Governance, Theory of ’ in Wolfrum, Encyclopedia of Pub-
lic International Law, Vol. iv, pp. 541–553.
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actors, both in the public and the private sphere. This development has been 
aptly coined by Gupta as the ‘transparency turn’.16 Due to the variety of con-
texts in which transparency is used and promulgated, it may have multiple 
meanings, which of course underlies the problems of defining the standard for 
the purposes of the sdgs. However, notwithstanding the plurality of contexts 
in which the term is used, a common feature underpinning all understandings 
of ‘transparency’ is the availability or disclosure of information. Peters defines 
transparency as ‘a culture, condition, scheme or structure in which relevant 
information […] is available’ and contrasts the notion with such diverse ant-
onyms as opaqueness, secrecy, confidentiality, complexity and disorder.17
The availability of information however does not necessarily guarantee that 
the information is accessible. Whether information is truly accessible depends 
on both formal and material conditions.18 A question that should be raised is 
therefore whether the standard of transparency requires that procedures are 
put in place to obtain access to information (formal accessibility) and whether 
information should be presented in a way as to enable those for whom it is 
destined to understand the information (material accessibility). It is posited 
that disclosing information in and of itself serves no purpose unless it can be 
easily accessed and is comprehensible for its beneficiaries, which would fur-
ther inform transparency as a standard. The question of accessibility in turn 
raises other questions, related to the beneficiaries (accessible to whom?) and 
the objectives of transparency (for what purpose?).
As regards the beneficiaries, a distinction can be drawn between the gen-
eral public on the one hand and States and international organizations on the 
other. For third States and international organizations, transparency require-
ments are strongly embedded in specific treaty regimes, mostly in the form of 
reporting obligations.19 The specific requirements however vary greatly across 
the various regimes. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
16 Aarti Gupta, ‘Transparency under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in Global Environ-
mental Governance’, Global Environmental Politics, 8/2: 1–7 (2008), p. 1.
17 Anne Peters, ‘Towards Transparency as a Global Norm’ in Bianchi and Peters, Transpar-
ency in International Law, pp. 534–544.
18 The issue of material accessibility is raised by Andrea Bianchi, ‘On Power and Illusion: 
The Concept of Transparency in International Law’ in Bianchi and Peters, Transparency 
in International Law, p. 10. Bianchi argues that whether information is accessible depends 
on the capabilities of the interpreter.
19 These reporting obligations can be found in a variety of treaty regimes, ranging from an 
obligation for States to report their exercise of the right to self-defense to the UN Security 
Council under the UN Charter to reporting their climate change policies to the secretariat 
of the Paris Agreement under the climate change regime.
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Rights (iccpr), for example, States are to submit a report every four years, in 
which they set out ‘the measures they have adopted which give effect to the 
rights recognized [in the Covenant] and on the progress made in the enjoy-
ment of those rights’ as well as ‘the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting 
the implementation of the […] Covenant’.20 In contrast, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (cites), 
an environmental treaty which uses a permit system to regulate the trade in 
endangered species, requires parties to submit annual reports containing an 
overview of ‘the number and type of permits and certificates granted; the 
States with which […] trade [in specimens and species] occurred; the numbers 
or quantities and types of specimens, names of species as included in Appen-
dices i, ii and iii and, where applicable, the size and sex of the specimens in 
question’ as well as bi-annual reports on legislative, regulatory and administra-
tive measures taken to enforce the Convention’s provisions.21
In addition, it is generally accepted that an obligation for States to notify 
other States exists in particular circumstances, whether as part of dedicated 
treaty regimes or on the basis of customary international law. This was first 
enunciated by the International Court of Justice in its 1949 Corfu Channel 
judgment in relation to Albania’s obligation to notify third States of a minefield 
in its territorial waters.22 It seems that this customary obligation now extends 
to other situations as well, such as with respect to activities which may have 
a significant transboundary environmental effect.23 This obligation follows 
from Principle 19 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment and has been further developed through specialized treaty regimes as 
well as through the case law of the International Court of Justice on shared 
natural resources.24 The obligation to notify is however very much confined to 
20 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed 16 December 1966; en-
tered into force 23 March 1976), unts 999: 171, Article 40.
21 1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(signed 3 March 1973; entered into force 1 July 1975), unts 993: 243, Article 8(7).
22 See Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 
Judgment, icj Rep. 1949, 22.
23 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (4th 
edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 695.
24 In its 2010 Pulp Mills judgment, the Court indicated that the obligation to inform the 
mechanism established by Argentina and Uruguay for the management of their shared 
waters ‘allows for the initiation of co-operation between the Parties which is necessary in 
order to fulfill the obligation of prevention’, the latter being ‘part of the corpus of inter-
national law relating to the environment’. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina 
v. Uruguay), Judgment, icj Rep. 2010, 14, paras. 101 and 102. In its 2015 judgment in the 
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situations involving risks, whether these concern emergency situations or situ-
ations in which a State’s proposed activities may have harmful effects on other 
States.25 More general obligations for States to share information with other 
States are notably encompassed by the reporting obligations under distinct 
treaty regimes, as indicated earlier in this section.
With respect to the general public, transparency is inextricably connected 
to the right for individuals and designated minorities, most importantly indig-
enous peoples, to have access to information as well as to the principle of pub-
lic participation in decision-making.26 While this confirms that the standard 
of transparency is prima facie embedded in international law, its scope can 
only be determined with reference to relevant legal instruments. The Conven-
tion on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), which is the 
most comprehensive treaty in this respect, requires, for example, that infor-
mation ‘is effectively accessible’, which implies inter alia that public authori-
ties provide ‘sufficient information to the public about the type and scope of 
environmental information held by the relevant public authorities, the basic 
terms and conditions under which such information is made available and 
accessible, and the process by which it can be obtained’.27 While the Aarhus 
Convention is a regional treaty, similar requirements were put forward by the 
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 34, dealing with the 
right of access to information for the purpose of the right to freedom of expres-
sion incorporated in Article 19 of the iccpr.28 Transparency in this context is 
therefore understood first and foremost as an obligation for States to establish 
mechanisms that enable individuals to gain access to information (formal ac-
cessibility). In contrast, no specific requirements have been formulated with 
Costa Rica-Nicaragua and Nicaragua- Costa Rica cases, the Court implicitly confirmed 
the existence of an obligation under customary international law to notify potentially 
affected States when there are risks of significant transboundary environmental damage. 
See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), 
Judgment, icj Rep. 2015, 665, para. 107.
25 Sands and Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law, p. 685.
26 Maeve McDonagh, ‘The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law’, Hu-
man Rights Law Review, 13/1: 25–55 (2013).
27 2001 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (signed 28 June 1998; entered into force 30 
October 2001), unts 2161: 447, Article 5(2)(a).
28 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 concerning Article 19: Freedoms of 
Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, paras. 18 and 19.
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respect to the quality of the information that is disclosed, in other words its 
comprehensibility (material accessibility).
Related to the distinction between various beneficiaries, transparency may 
serve several purposes. Disclosure of information may firstly serve to improve 
the knowledge base for decision-making. In this respect, transparency may 
help to ensure that all participants in a process or parties to a treaty can rely 
on adequate information as a basis for decision-making. In addition, transpar-
ency may help to ensure the inclusiveness of the decision-making process, in 
the sense that it allows affected communities to participate in the decision-
making process and to hold decision-makers accountable.29 The close con-
nection between transparency and accountability also becomes apparent if 
one considers a second purpose of transparency, which is related to ensuring 
compliance.30 Arguably, the act of disclosing information is in itself a form of 
accountability. In addition, the availability of information may help to assess 
the extent to which duty-bearers comply with their obligations. This, in turn, is 
a prerequisite for holding actors accountable for their actions. These forms of 
accountability are examined in more detail in the following sub-section.
2.2 Accountability
Like transparency, accountability is an open-ended concept which can be used 
in a variety of settings. At its core, accountability refers to ‘the process of being 
called ‘to account’ to some authority for one’s actions’.31 This short definition 
can be traced back to Bovens’ definition of accountability, which is used as a 
framework of reference by all authors working on accountability. Bovens de-
fines accountability as a ‘relationship between an actor and a forum, in which 
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pose judgement, and the actor may face conse-
quences.’ 32 Most importantly, the definition emphasizes that accountability is 
29 See, e.g., Jonas Ebbesson, ‘Global or European Only? International Law on Transparency 
in Environmental Matters for Members of the Public’ in Bianchi and Peters, Transparency 
in International Law, pp. 49–74; Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, ‘Transparency and Interna-
tional Environmental Institutions’ in Bianchi and Peters, Transparency in International 
Law, pp. 23–48.
30 Peters, ‘Towards Transparency as a Global Norm’, p. 543.
31 Richard Mulgan, “Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?’, Public Administration, 
78/3: 555–573 (2000), p. 555. See further Deirdre Curtin and André Nollkaemper, ‘Con-
ceptualizing Accountability in International and European Law’, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, 36/1: 3–20 (2005).
32 Mark Bovens, ‘Public Accountability’ in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence Lynn and Christopher 
Pollitt (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 182–208.
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a ‘relational concept, linking those who owe an account to those to whom it is 
owned’.33
In international law, accountability has traditionally been addressed 
through the prism of State responsibility.34 This regime however suffers from 
important inherent limitations. As Brunnée rightly points out, ‘[b]y definition, 
the regime can facilitate only inter-state accountability on the basis of positive 
legal rules’.35 In other words, the system is premised on two conditions, which 
reduce its utility as a tool to foster accountability in a broader sense. The first 
is that the regime points to States as being exclusively competent to invoke the 
responsibility of other States.36 This limitation has been partially overcome 
through the development of specialized regimes, which provide avenues for 
individuals, international organizations and corporations respectively to hold 
States accountable for their behavior. 37 Conversely, similar developments 
have occurred with respect to the addressees of accountability. The most 
notable developments include the adoption of the ilc draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations with respect to accountability 
for international organizations and the emergence of international criminal 
33 Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans and Robert Goodin, ‘Public Accountability’ in Mark 
Bovens, Robert Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 7.
34 Jutta Brunnée, ‘International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State 
Responsibility’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 36/1: 3–38 (2005).
35 Ibid., p. 5.
36 See International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, Part iii, Chapter I, 
Annex to unga Resolution 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001.
37 The role of human rights treaty monitoring bodies is of particular significance for individ-
uals. Implementation reviews, which are connected to States’ reporting obligations under 
a variety of treaty regimes, are an important tool for international organizations to hold 
States accountable. Finally, corporations have been given a right to resort to international 
arbitration pursuant to international investment law. See International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commen-
taries, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 
23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), A/56/10; Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: 
The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), pp. 172–173; Brunnée, ‘International Legal Accountability through the Lens of 
the Law of State Responsibility’, p. 33; Alan Alexandroff and Ian Liaird, ‘Compliance and 
Enforcement’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
pp. 1175–1185.
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tribunals for individuals.38 In these ways, accountability as an international 
legal concept has moved beyond the strictly inter-State paradigm.
However, accountability as an international legal concept remains incom-
plete. This is not only related to limitations in terms of mechanisms to hold 
actors accountable, but also due to restrictions in its normative content. This 
brings us to the second limitation that can be discerned from Brunnée’s de-
scription of the regime of State responsibility, namely that accountability de-
pends on the breach of a positive legal rule. This is problematic in an era in 
which informal standard-setting instruments have gained traction as alterna-
tive regulatory frameworks on the international plane. As these instruments 
do not impose legally binding obligations on their addressees, they are not gov-
erned by international legal accountability frameworks. In addition, several of 
these instruments aim to regulate the behavior of actors who are at most par-
tial subjects of international law. For instance, corporations have no binding 
obligations under international law, notwithstanding the fact that they have 
been granted selective rights under international investment law. Informal 
regulatory frameworks are the only tools that formulate standards for these 
actors with respect to fundamental international legal norms.
As the traditional international legal framework for accountability is not 
well suited to accommodate this new reality, scholars have started to reconsider 
how accountability should be framed in international law. Research develops 
along two different lines, which correspond to a more general distinction made 
by Bovens between accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism.39 The first 
conceptualizes accountability as ‘a normative concept, as a set of standards for 
the evaluation of the behaviour of public actors’.40 This idea underlies efforts 
to formulate substantive and procedural standards for accountability as, for 
instance, undertaken as part of the Global Administrative Law project. These 
standards include transparency, participation, reasoned decision-making, re-
view and legality.41 Accountability in this sense focuses on substantive norms 
that define accountable behavior.
The second conception of accountability, according to Bovens, regards ac-
countability as a social mechanism and defines it as ‘an institutional relation 
38 Brunnée, ‘International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Re-
sponsibility’, pp. 21–31.
39 Mark Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mech-
anism’, West European Politics, 33/5: 946–967 (2010).
40 Ibid., p. 947.
41 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 68/3–4: 15–61 (2005), p. 17.
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or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum’.42 It is 
this conception of accountability that underlies Bovens’ original definition of 
accountability, as presented at the start of this sub-section. The following defi-
nition, which was developed as part of the Informal International Law-Making 
project (IN-law), builds on that definition and complements it for the pur-
pose of understanding accountability in the context of informal international 
legal instruments:
Accountability is a relationship (at the domestic or international level) 
between an actor (exercising public authority in the context of IN-law) 
and a forum (internal to the IN-law process or an external stakeholder), 
in which the actor has an obligation (in particular, but not exclusively, ex-
pressed in legal rules or procedures) to explain and to justify his or her 
conduct (ex ante leading up to a decision or ex post in the implementation 
of a decision), the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor may face consequences (in particular, but not exclusively, so as to 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of IN-LAW).43
An important aspect of this definition is that it distinguishes between two 
functions of accountability as a mechanism, namely as a means to improve 
the quality of decision-making (ex ante) and as a means to assess the quality of 
decision-making (ex post). This represents a more comprehensive view of the 
functions of accountability, as it includes influencing future behavior to the 
same degree as sanctioning past behavior.
Another useful framework of reference is provided by Curtin and Nollkaem-
per, who distinguish between ‘giving account’ and ‘holding to account’.44 Their 
approach to ‘giving account’ of one’s behavior largely corresponds to Bovens’ 
first type of accountability, namely accountability as a virtue. It refers to the 
act of disclosing information (transparency) and justifying behavior. ‘Holding 
to account’ on the other hand refers to Bovens’ second type of accountability, 
namely accountability as a social mechanism. Curtin and Nollkaemper define 
this second form of accountability as ‘a process in which an actor explains con-
duct and gives information to others, in which a judgment or assessment of 
42 Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability’, p. 946.
43 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Law-making: Framing the Concept and Research 
Questions’ in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds.), Informal Interna-
tional Law-making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 28.
44 Curtin and Nollkaemper, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability in International and European 
Law’, p. 7.
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that conduct is rendered on the basis of prior established rules or principles 
and in which it may be possible for some form of sanction (formal or informal) 
to be imposed on the actor’.45 This form of accountability includes the pos-
sibility for the beneficiaries to assess whether the actions of the duty-bearers 
violate the rules or standards, to appeal these in an international forum and to 
attach consequences to these violations.46
Although the distinction between ‘giving account’ and ‘holding to account’ 
is in itself useful and will be adopted throughout the present analysis, it is sub-
mitted that these notions should be redefined. In the opinion of the present 
author, giving account necessarily implies that an actor explains its conduct 
and justifies its behavior (both ex ante and ex post) vis-à-vis another actor. 
From this perspective, giving account would therefore refer to requirements 
(whether formal or informal) for actors to provide information to designat-
ed beneficiaries. As Bovens argues, ‘[e]xplanations and justifications are not 
made in a void, but vis-à-vis a significant other’.47 In contrast, ‘holding to ac-
count’ in this context sees to the possibility for (affected) actors to appeal to an 
internal or external mechanism that can verify compliance (whether ex post or 
ex ante) with a prescribed set of standards and potentially provides remedies 
for non-compliance. These mechanisms could include courts and tribunals, 
but also other – external or internal – monitoring mechanisms.
Consequently, the current contribution approaches accountability first 
and foremost as a social mechanism, which is firmly based on a relationship 
between two types of actors: duty-bearers on the one hand and beneficiaries 
on the other. Obviously, depending on the institutional framework, actors can 
switch between these roles. This is especially the case for peer-review mecha-
nisms, in which actors must give account to and can be held accountable by 
their peers.
2.3 Connections and Approach
Section 2 explored the notions of transparency and accountability. It argued 
that transparency may serve several interrelated purposes, such as improving 
45 Ibid., p. 8.
46 The term ‘consequences’ is preferred over the term ‘sanctions’, since it is more neutral and 
encompasses a broader array of possibilities to hold an actor accountable for its actions. 
See Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability’, p. 952. See also Katherine Fortin, The Ac-
countability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), p. 6. This broader conception regarding the possibilities to hold actors accountable 
is essential in the context of this contribution, since the possibilities that the kpcs and 
the oecd Guidance offer to hold actors to account do not necessarily qualify as sanctions.
47 Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability’ p. 951.
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the knowledge base for decision-making and enhancing the inclusiveness of 
the decision-making process. However, there is also a clear overlap with ac-
countability, as transparency ultimately also serves to provide the means for 
holding actors accountable for their behavior. This makes it difficult to clearly 
distinguish between the two notions.
After all, for the purposes of the present contribution, accountability is de-
fined as a two-pronged notion, consisting of a requirement to give account 
of one’s actions vis-à-vis designated beneficiaries and a possibility to be held 
to account for one’s actions. This includes justifying behavior leading up to a 
decision. The principal difference between transparency proper and account-
ability in this context is the underlying rationale for providing information. 
Making information available as an aspect of transparency proper aims to en-
sure a proper functioning of the system, as it provides the basis for informed 
decision-making. In the context of accountability, on the other hand, provid-
ing information has the objective of enabling beneficiaries to scrutinize the 
behavior of actors.
The following sections introduce the institutional setting of the kpcs and 
the oecd Guidance (section  3) and assess the ways in which these instru-
ments construe transparency and accountability (section 4). More precisely, 
it is assessed to what extent the initiatives require actors to make information 
available and to whom (both as an aspect of transparency proper and as a first 
component of accountability); to what extent mechanisms are established to 
verify compliance (second component of accountability); and to what extent 
mechanisms are created to impose sanctions in case of violation of the stan-
dards (third component of accountability).
3 Introducing the kpcs and the oecd Guidance
Section 3 contextualises the two instruments for the purpose of clarifying the 
institutional setting in which the transparency and accountability standards 
operate. Sub-section  3.1 examines the principal characteristics of the kpcs, 
while sub-section  3.2 focuses on the oecd Guidance. Sub-section  3.3 com-
pares the characteristics of the two instruments.
3.1 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
The kpcs was set up between 2000 and 2002 for the purpose of finding an 
effective international solution to stopping the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’, 
defined by the scheme as ‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their 
allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as 
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described in relevant United Nations Security Council (unsc) resolutions’.48 
For this purpose, governments, civil society and the diamond industry intro-
duced a system for the certification of rough diamonds, thereby distinguish-
ing legal (certified) diamonds from illegal (uncertified) diamonds. In this way, 
these actors sought to ensure that States would be able to continue exporting 
and importing diamonds, while closing the trade routes for armed groups at 
the same time.49
The kpcs is a stand alone initiative, in the sense that it is not embedded 
in an international organization. The process was set up as a partnership be-
tween governments, the diamond industry and interested ngos in order to 
ensure that all relevant stakeholders would be involved in the initiative.50 This 
multi-stakeholder partnership is reflected in the governance structure of the 
kpcs, which is gradually evolving towards an international organization.51 
Decision-making is reserved to the Plenary, which convenes once a year and 
consists of all relevant stakeholders. However, decision-making power itself 
has been reserved to formal participants (States and regional organizations), 
while representatives from the diamond industry and civil society, in their 
48 See Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme, Core document, Section I. The Security Coun-
cil had previously adopted sanctions targeting the export of diamonds originating from 
Angola and Sierra Leone, armed conflicts that were both financed through the trade in 
rough diamonds. See unsc Resolution 1173, S/RES/1173 (1998), 12 June 1998 and unsc 
Resolution 1295, S/RES/1295 (2000), 18 April 2000 concerning the armed conflict in An-
gola; unsc Resolution 1306, S/RES/1306 (2000), 5 July 2000 concerning the armed conflict 
in Sierra Leone; and unsc Resolution 1343, S/RES/1343 (2001), 7 March 2001 concerning 
Liberia’s involvement in the smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. However, in the 
absence of an effective system in place to track the origin of diamonds mined in these 
States, these sanctions could easily be busted by armed groups smuggling the diamonds 
into neighbouring countries, from where they were re-exported and sold on the inter-
national market. See Panel of Experts on Angola, Report of the Panel of Experts on Viola-
tions of Security Council Sanctions Against unita (Fowler report), S/2000/203, 10 March 
2000, paras. 75–114; and Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, Report of the Panel of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in Relation to 
Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, paras. 65–166.
49 This system is discussed in more detail in section 4.
50 For an overview of the negotiating history, see Clive Wright, ‘The Kimberley Process Cer-
tification Scheme: A Model Negotiation?’ in Païvi Lujala and Siri Rustad (eds.), High-Value 
Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012), pp. 181–187.
51 See Gloria Fernández Arribas, ‘The Institutionalization of a Process: The Development 
of the Kimberley Process towards an International Organization’, International Organiza-
tions Law Review, 13/2: 308–340 (2016).
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capacity of observers, have been granted the right to intervene and to submit 
proposals and amendments.52
This suggests that the kpcs reserves norm creation to the traditional sub-
jects of international law. This is somewhat counterbalanced by the active par-
ticipation of civil society and the diamond industry in the kpcs committees 
and working groups, which have been established to address particular aspects 
relevant to the further development and implementation of the scheme. The 
process itself is overseen by a Chair, a position that rotates on an annual basis 
between the kpcs participants.53 A permanent secretariat to support the work 
of the kpcs was finally established in 2013, ten years after the kpcs entered 
into force. The functions of this Administrative Support Mechanism (asm) in-
clude the collection of all data submitted by participants as well as all KP deci-
sions, to arrange for the distribution of information to the participants and the 
general public, to provide logistical support to the KP Chair, working groups 
and committees and to provide technical support to the participants.54 The 
asm therefore has the primary responsibility for both internal and external 
transparency for the process itself.
3.2 The oecd Guidance
The Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas was developed through several multi-
stakeholder meetings held between 2009 and 2011 by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) in cooperation with the 
UN Group of Experts on the DR Congo, the International Conference for 
the Great Lakes Region (icglr), the business community and civil society.55  
52 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Core document, Section vi and the 2003 
kp Administrative Decision Rules of Procedure of meetings of the plenary and its Ad Hoc 
Working Groups and Subsidiary bodies (Johannesburg) for more specific rules regarding 
decision-making (Rule 42) and participation of observers (Rule 45).
53 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Core document, Section vi (4).
54 Ibid., Section vi and Amendment to the 2010 Administrative Decision on the Establishment 
of an Ad Hoc Committee for Exploring the Modalities of Enhancing the Efficiency of the Kim-
berley Process with a View to Provide Administrative Support for Its Activities, Administra-
tive Decision of 3 November 2011, available at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/
documents, accessed 21 February 2019.
55 The UN Group of Experts on the DR Congo is a fact-finding body established as a sub-
sidiary body of the UN Security Council to assist the Security Council to take informed 
decisions on the armed conflict in the DR Congo. The International Conference for the 
Great Lakes Region is an intergovernmental organization consisting of States in the 
African Great Lakes Region.
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Its purpose is to prevent corporations which operate in or source from conflict-
affected or high-risk areas from contributing to serious human rights abuses 
or international crimes associated with the extraction, transport or trade in 
minerals; and to prevent corporations from providing any form of support to 
armed groups or from engaging in bribery and/or fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion of minerals.56
When the Guidance was adopted in 2011, it focused primarily on the three 
categories of minerals that are mostly associated with armed conflict in the 
African Great Lakes Region. These are tin, tantalum and tungsten, including 
their ores or mineral derivatives.57 The Guidance was subsequently amended 
in 2012 to cover gold. A further amendment in 2015 clarified that the oecd 
Guidance applies to all minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.58
The Guidance is embedded in a broader framework of instruments and 
policies, both within and outside the oecd. Firstly, it is part of the policy 
framework adopted by the oecd in the field of International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises that is intended to enhance corporate social 
responsibility. More specifically, the Guidance is an implementation tool for 
the supply chain due diligence requirements set out in the oecd Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, which are in turn based on the human rights 
due diligence framework established by Harvard professor John Ruggie.59 Sec-
ondly, the Guidance is a reference document for the more specific guidelines 
adopted by the UN Security Council for mineral resources from the African 
56 oecd, oecd Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (3rd edn., Paris: oecd Publishing, 2016), available 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en, accessed 21 February 2019. For a detailed 
assessment of the normative function of the Guidance, see Mary Footer, ‘Human Rights 
Due Diligence and the Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
Areas: Towards a Normative Framework?’ in Jernej Černič and Tara Van Ho (eds.), Human 
Rights and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability for Human Rights (Oisterwijk: Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2015), pp. 179–228.
57 oecd, Recommendation of the oecd Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, C(2012)93, 25 May 
2011 (amended on 17 July 2012),.
58 oecd Council on Due Diligence Guidance, p. 4.
59 The 2011 revised Guidelines contain recommendations on responsible business conduct 
for multinational companies, including recommendations on supply chain due diligence 
for the purpose of helping companies ‘to identify, prevent and mitigate actual and poten-
tial adverse impacts […] and account for how these impacts are addressed’. See oecd, 
oecd Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: oecd Publishing, 2011), Chapter ii, 
para. A 10.
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Great Lakes Region which establish mandatory due diligence requirements for 
corporations aimed at curbing the trade in conflict minerals and promoting 
responsible supply chains of minerals.60 Thirdly, several States have adopted 
domestic legislation to implement the Guidance.61 Whereas the oecd Guid-
ance in itself does not impose legally binding obligations on corporations, it 
therefore does so indirectly within the specific context of the UN Security 
Council sanctions regime with respect to the DR Congo and through domestic 
implementation legislation.
3.3 Comparing the Institutional Setting
The current sub-section compares the two initiatives for the purpose of clari-
fying the institutional setting in which their transparency and accountability 
standards operate. From a legal positivist perspective, it is important to note 
that both initiatives have created instruments that are informal in nature and 
which are not part of formal international law.62 The fact that the oecd Guid-
ance is embedded in an international organization, while the kpcs is a stand-
alone initiative, does not affect the legal nature of the instruments themselves. 
Both instruments obtain legal effect notably through domestic implementa-
tion legislation. While the kpcs explicitly requires States to adopt domes-
tic implementation legislation as part of their commitments,63 the oecd  
Guidance relies on States promoting the standards in their national systems, 
including through their oecd National Contact Points (ncps). Every oecd 
60 See Group of Experts, Final Report Prepared Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council 
Resolution 1896 (2009), S/2010/596, 29 November 2010 for the guidelines presented by the 
Group of Experts on the DR Congo to the Security Council; and unsc Resolution 1952, 
S/RES/1952 (2010), 29 November 2010, especially para. 7, for the Security Council’s en-
dorsement of the guidelines. See also Dam-de Jong, ‘UN Natural Resources Sanctions 
Regimes’.
61 See, e.g., with regard to the usa the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, 21 July 2010, Bill number H.R. 4173, Report number H. Rept. 111–517, S. Rept. 
111–176, Section 1502 (on conflict minerals from the DR Congo) and Section 1504 (on pay-
ments made by corporations in the oil, gas and minerals industries to governments); with 
regard to the EU see Regulation 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers 
of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and 
high-risk areas, Official Journal of the European Union L130 60, 19 May 2017.
62 For the concept of informal international law, see Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, Infor-
mal International Law-making.
63 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Core document, Section iv(d).
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member is obliged to appoint such an ncp for the purpose of furthering the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines.64 In addition, as mentioned earlier, various 
States have adopted specific legislation, implementing the oecd Guidance in 
their domestic legislation.
The substantive scope of the oecd Guidance and the kpcs present some 
overlap, in the sense that both initiatives aim to curb the trade in (particu-
lar) conflict minerals. Whereas the kpcs focuses exclusively on diamonds, the 
oecd Guidance covers all minerals, including diamonds. This overlap should 
not be problematic given the complementary nature of the two initiatives in 
terms of their addressees.
This in fact marks an important difference between the two initiatives. 
Whereas the kpcs formulates standards for States, the oecd Guidance fo-
cuses on corporations. The two initiatives may even be said to mirror one an-
other. This becomes apparent when one considers both initiatives within the 
broader context in which they operate. Where the kpcs is backed up by a sys-
tem of warranties developed by the World Diamond Council for corporations 
purchasing diamonds,65 the oecd Guidance is backed up, at least where the 
African Great Lakes Region is concerned, by a regional certification mecha-
nism for tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold mines.66
In addition to the differences between the two initiatives in terms of their 
addressees, it should also be noted that there are important differences with 
respect to the practices that the initiatives address. Firstly, the kpcs focuses 
exclusively on banning trade with non-state armed groups, whereas the oecd 
Guidance also addresses trade with governments under particular circum-
stances. Secondly, in terms of the types of abuses covered, the kpcs is limited 
to conflict financing, whereas the oecd Guidance encompasses other types of 
abuses as well, including corruption. Of course, these differences in terms of 
64 See oecd, oecd Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), Part ii, Amendment of 
the Decision of the Council on the oecd Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Section I, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf, accessed 21 February 2019.
65 The kpcs is paralleled by a system of self-regulation for the diamond industry under the 
auspices of the World Diamond Council. This Council has been established in 2000 with 
the purpose of ‘represent[ing] the diamond industry in the development and implemen-
tation of regulatory and voluntary systems to control the trade in diamonds embargoed 
by the United Nations or covered by the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’. For 
more details see www.worlddiamondcouncil.com, accessed 21 February 2019.
66 icglr, icglr Regional Certification Mechanism (rcm) — Certification Manual, p. 11, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf, accessed 21 February 
2019.
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addressees and scope have implications for the way in which the transparency 
and accountability standards are operationalized and thereby for their contri-
bution to achieving target 16.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals. This is 
discussed in the following section.
4 A Closer Look at the Standards
Section 4 discusses the standards established by the two initiatives and analy-
ses their contribution to creating ‘effective, accountable and transparent in-
stitutions at all levels’ within the context of target 16.6 of the 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals. For this purpose, sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2 examine how 
the respective initiatives construe the standards.
4.1 The kpcs
As explained in sub-section 3.1, the kpcs is a certification mechanism aimed 
at preventing conflict diamonds from entering the global supply chain. The 
scheme operates on the basis of a system of import and export permits for 
shipments of rough diamonds, to be implemented by participating States.67 A 
large discretion is left to the States themselves in devising and implementing 
a certification scheme, as long as they meet certain minimal standards pre-
scribed by the kpcs regarding their processes for issuing Certificates as well as 
certain minimum requirements regarding the Certificates themselves.68 These 
minimum standards and requirements include transparency requirements.
Firstly, transparency requirements have been formulated as part of the 
minimum requirements for the certificates to enable importing countries to 
verify the identity and contents of the shipment of diamonds that enters their 
territory. Exporting States are required to indicate details on the Certificate re-
garding inter alia the country of origin, the issuing authority, the carat weight, 
the value and the number of parcels in the shipment.69 Importing States are 
required to inter alia send a confirmation of receipt to the exporting State, 
which refers to the Certificate number, the number of parcels, the carat weight 
and the details of the importer and exporter.70 These transparency require-
ments can therefore be seen as a form of sharing of information between par-
ticipants, which primarily aims to ensure the proper functioning of the system.
67 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Core document, Section iii.
68 Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme, Core document, Section ii.
69 Ibid., Annex I.
70 Ibid., Section iii.
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Secondly, the kpcs has included transparency requirements in the mini-
mum standards regarding the internal processes for issuing Certificates.71 
Participating States are required to communicate information on their laws, 
regulations, rules, procedures and practices to the KP Chair and other partici-
pants for the purpose of informing the other participants of how the kpcs re-
quirements are implemented in their domestic jurisdiction.72 For this purpose, 
they submit an annual report. Moreover, participating States are to collect and 
maintain relevant official production, import and export data in a structured 
manner, as well as to exchange such statistical data with other participants in 
the scheme.73 These transparency requirements are therefore aimed at ensur-
ing the integrity of the certification process itself. The purpose of sharing infor-
mation on implementation is ultimately to enable other participants and ob-
servers to verify compliance with the standards. As such, these requirements 
are directly related to accountability.
It is important to note that the kpcs does not include formal transparency 
requirements for the benefit of the general public. Nevertheless, a practice has 
developed which requires the publication of country implementation reports 
and key statistical data on diamond imports and exports on the KP website, 
together with decisions by relevant KP committees and working groups.74 This 
practice is based on administrative decisions adopted by working groups and 
committees and, as such, has become mandatory for KP participants.75
Consequently, transparency in the kpcs is construed in two ways. The re-
quirements relating to the information that should be transmitted with the 
certificates enables public officials to make an informed decision on whether 
or not to accept a shipment of diamonds. These transparency requirements 
can be regarded as a means to improve decision-making. The obligations for 
participating States to report on their implementation of the kpcs require-
ments in their domestic systems and to disclose statistical information relating 
to their diamond trade on the other hand are more closely related to account-
ability. These can be considered examples of ‘giving account’. This information 
71 Of course, these requirements are part of a broader package of measures that States 
should take, including an obligation to establish a system of internal controls that is de-
signed to eliminate conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds; to designate 
Import and Export Authorities and to implement relevant legislation. Ibid., Section iv.
72 Ibid., Sections iv and vi(11).
73 Ibid., Sections iv, v and Annex iv.
74 See https://www.kimberleyprocess.com, accessed 21 February 2019.
75 See, e.g., Administrative Decision on Publication of Aggregated Statistical Data, as adopt-
ed at the Gaborone Plenary, November 2006, amended at the Brussels Plenary, November 
2007.
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could in turn be used to raise awareness among the general public, to assess 
compliance and to act in situations of non-compliance. This raises the ques-
tion of whether and to what extent the kpcs also includes mechanisms to hold 
participants accountable in cases of non-compliance. In particular, it raises 
the interrelated questions of whether the kpcs has established mechanisms 
to verify compliance, on the one hand, and whether it can impose sanctions in 
case of violation of the standards, on the other hand.
Of course, it should be emphasised that the kpcs standards are not bind-
ing under international law which means that the secondary rules on State 
responsibility do not play any role in their enforcement. However, compliance 
with the standards is mandatory for States wishing to participate in the kpcs. 
Compliance is verified in first instance by the Working Group on Monitor-
ing, in which participants and observers are both represented.76 This work-
ing group is responsible for the assessment of the annual reports on domestic 
implementation submitted by the participants and to report on progress to 
the Plenary. Compliance is also verified through a peer-review system. Review 
visits are regularly sent to the participating States, consisting of representa-
tives of other participating States, the diamond industry and ngos. In cases of 
suspicion of non-compliance with the kpcs standards, the Plenary can further 
decide to conduct a review mission.77 However, participants have to formally 
consent to the carrying out of such a mission.78 In both situations, follow-up 
action can be taken, including the formulation of a compliance program by the 
Participation Committee, which should be implemented in order to achieve 
compliance status.79 This type of non-compliance mechanism resembles in 
many respects some of the more sophisticated procedures that have been cre-
ated for the purpose of ensuring compliance with multilateral environmen-
tal agreements, such as cites.80 An important innovation introduced by the 
76 See Working Group on Monitoring, 2014 Terms of Reference of the Working Group on Moni-
toring, available at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2014-terms-reference-working 
-group-monitoring, accessed 21 February 2019.
77 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Core document, Section vi (13–14).
78 See the 2003 Administrative Decision on the Implementation of Peer Review in the kpcs, 
available at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/documents, accessed 21 February 
2019. The peer review system has been revised several times, the last revision dates from 
2012.
79 See Revised Guidelines for the Participation Committee in Recommending Interim Measures 
as regards Serious Non-compliance with kpcs Minimum Requirements, available at https://
www.kimberleyprocess.com, accessed 21 February 2019.
80 See cites Res. Conf. 14.3 on cites compliance procedures, available at https://www.cites 
.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-14-03.pdf, accessed 21 February 2019.
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kpcs is the participation of the private sector and civil society in monitoring 
compliance. This indicates that accountability in the context of the kpcs is 
construed more broadly, extending to the general public as represented by civil 
society. In practice, however, civil society participation has been reduced over 
the course of the years, ever since some of the founding ngos walked out of 
the process due to dissatisfaction about particular decisions taken by the par-
ticipating States.81
In case of serious non-compliance, i.e. of a nature to threaten the effective-
ness and credibility of the kpcs, a range of measures can be taken, including 
enhanced monitoring.82 In terms of actual sanctions for non-compliance, the 
only possibility is suspension from export and import operation.83 This is a se-
rious sanction, since it effectively precludes a State from trading in diamonds. 
This is because participants in the kpcs, including all States hosting major 
diamond markets, are not allowed to trade diamonds with suspended States or 
non-participants.84 States which are subjected to this sanction remain partici-
pants in the kpcs, but may only resume diamond imports and exports after a 
decision to this effect has been taken by the Plenary.85
The kpcs therefore covers all three constitutive elements of accountabil-
ity as set out in sub-section 2.3. It encompasses an obligation to give account, 
which is reflected in the transparency requirements with respect to reporting 
on domestic implementation and to make available statistical data (first com-
ponent of accountability). The kpcs further includes monitoring mechanisms 
as a means to assess compliance with the standards, most notably through a 
cooperation between the Working Group on Monitoring and the Plenary (sec-
ond component of accountability). Finally, sanctions can be imposed in case 
81 See in this regard, e.g., the Press Release by Global Witness, ‘Global Witness Leaves Kimber-
ley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade to be Held Accountable’, 2 December 2011, available 
at https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process 
-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable/, accessed 21 February 2019.
82 See Revised Guidelines for the Participation Committee in Recommending Interim Measures 
as regards Serious Non-compliance with kpcs Minimum Requirements, Section  12, avail-
able at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com, accessed 21 February 2019.
83 Ibid.
84 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Core document, Section iii(c). The kpcs 
currently has fifty-five participants, representing eighty-two countries, encompassing ap-
proximately 99.8% of the global production of rough diamonds, available at https://www 
.kimberleyprocess.com, accessed 21 February 2019.
85 See Revised Guidelines for the Participation Committee in Recommending Interim Measures 
as regards Serious Non-compliance with kpcs Minimum Requirements, Section  13, avail-
able at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com, accessed 21 February 2019.
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of non-compliance, consisting of  suspension from the process (third compo-
nent of accountability). The presence of these monitoring mechanisms, how-
ever, does not necessarily suggest that the system truly fosters accountability 
in all respects. Transparency is primarily used as a tool to ensure the effective-
ness of the system. In addition, the purpose of the incentive-based monitoring 
mechanisms is first and foremost to improve implementation. Hence, these 
mechanisms are not to be regarded as judgments or assessments of conduct, 
as referred to in Curtin and Nollkaemper’s definition of accountability. Lastly, 
sanctions are rarely employed and when they are it is mostly with the consent 
of the non-compliant State.86
4.2 The oecd Guidance
As discussed in sub-section  3.2, the oecd due diligence framework aims to 
promote the exercise of due diligence throughout the minerals supply chain 
for the purpose of preventing complicity by corporations in gross human 
rights abuses and corruption. Due diligence itself is defined as ‘an on-going, 
proactive and reactive process through which companies can ensure that they 
respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict’.87 The due diligence 
framework is operationalized through a five-step approach aimed at identi-
fying and responding to risks in the supply chain. The basic components of 
this approach are the establishment of strong company management sys-
tems; the identification and assessment of supply chain risks; the design and 
implementation of strategies to respond to identified risks; the performance 
of independent third-party audits; and the annual reporting on supply chain 
due diligence.88 The oecd Guidance further contains two supplements that 
provide specific guidance to companies on how to implement these five steps 
when sourcing tin, tantalum or tungsten, on the one hand, and when sourcing 
gold, on the other hand.
The five-step approach includes several requirements with a view to en-
hance transparency and accountability. First of all, pursuant to step one of this 
approach, corporations are to implement internal policies in order to intro-
duce transparency in the minerals supply chain. Corporations ‘should adopt, 
86 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, accessed 21 February 2019. Cases of suspension 
include the Republic of the Congo in 2004, Venezuela in 2008 and the Central African 
Republic in 2013. Venezuela was a case of self-suspension. For more information see An-
drew Grant, ‘The Kimberley Process at ten: Reflections on a Decade of Efforts to End the 
Trade in Conflict Diamonds’ in Lujala and Rustad, High-value Natural Resources and Post-
conflict Peacebuilding, pp. 159–179.
87 oecd Council on Due Diligence Guidance, p. 13.
88 Ibid., Annex I, pp. 17–19.
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and clearly communicate to suppliers and the public, a company policy for the 
supply chain of minerals originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. 
This policy should incorporate the standards against which due diligence is to 
be conducted’.89 These standards must conform to particular principles laid 
down in a model supply chain policy that has been designed by the oecd. 
This model supply chain policy includes a requirement for corporations to 
ensure that all taxes, fees and royalties are paid to the government and that 
they are disclosed in accordance with the principles formulated by the Extrac-
tive Industry Transparency Initiative (eiti), a voluntary instrument that aims 
to eliminate corruption in the extractive sectors through the introduction of 
transparency requirements for payments by corporations to domestic public 
authorities.90 The principal purpose of this information sharing seems to be to 
enable the general public to take an informed decision on whether to purchase 
the products that have been produced by the respective corporation.
Other requirements pursuant to step one include the establishment of a 
system of controls over the mineral supply chain, including either a chain of 
custody or a traceability system, on the one hand, or the identification of up-
stream actors in the supply chain, on the other hand.91 More specifically, the 
Guidance requires corporations operating downstream in the supply chain 
(from smelters/refiners to retailers) to obtain information from their suppliers 
about the origin of the minerals purchased by them. Furthermore, corpora-
tions operating upstream in the supply chain (from the mine to smelters/refin-
ers) should provide such information to their business partners.92 Moreover, 
corporations throughout the supply chain must obtain information on their 
business partners.93 These transparency requirements are at the core of the 
system. Their purpose is to enable corporations throughout the supply chain 
to take informed decisions on the choice of their business partners. In this 
sense, they are to be considered both as conditions for the proper functioning 
of the system and as forms of giving account of behavior.
Transparency requirements have been included in other steps as well. 
Pursuant to step three, corporations are, for example, to establish internal 
89 Ibid., p. 17. More specific guidance on the types of measures corporations should take is 
provided in the supplements.
90 For more information on this initiative see https://eiti.org, accessed 21 February 2019.
91 oecd Council on Due Diligence Guidance.
92 Ibid. Also see the supplements on tin, tantalum and tungsten on the one hand and on gold 
on the other, which contain more specific requirements.
93 Ibid.
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reporting structures to respond to identified risks.94 Finally, step five requires 
corporations to publicly report on their supply chain due diligence policies and 
practices, for example, as part of their corporate social responsibility or annual 
reports.95 Therefore, transparency for the purposes of the oecd Guidance is 
both horizontal (between duty-bearers) and vertical (towards the general pub-
lic as beneficiaries). The purposes are two-fold: the requirements which relate 
to tracking the origin of the minerals and establishing the reliability of busi-
ness partners aim to ensure the proper functioning of the system, while the 
publication requirements aim to enable public scrutiny.
Where these requirements can be regarded as examples of the obligation to 
give account of one’s behavior, the oecd Guidance also contains requirements 
aimed at holding actors accountable. Firstly, when it comes to verifying com-
pliance, the Guidance has built in safeguards to ensure the credibility of the 
information relied on by downstream companies as well as the information 
provided to them by upstream companies. More specifically, pursuant to step 
four of the due diligence approach, smelters and refiners are to submit their 
administration to an independent audit for verification.96 This obligation does 
not apply to other corporations in the supply chain, although upstream corpo-
rations must allow the audit team access to company sites and to relevant doc-
umentation and records of supply chain due diligence practices.97 This form 
of accountability operates both horizontally and vertically, since the audit re-
ports must be published,98 while its primary purpose is to verify compliance.
In addition to its internal accountability mechanisms, the Guidance may 
benefit from the institutional structure established for the oecd Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, including its system of National Contact 
Points (ncps). Every oecd member State or adherent country is obliged to 
establish an ncp. As part of their mandate, ncps mediate in disputes that 
arise in relation to the implementation of the oecd Guidelines and related 
instruments.99 Complaints can be brought to the respective ncp by all inter-
ested parties, including worker organizations and non-governmental orga-
nizations. This procedure results either in a statement that the issues do not 
merit further consideration, a report outlining the agreement that the parties 
have reached or, lastly, a decision of non-compliance by the ncp including 
94 Ibid., p. 18.
95 Ibid., p. 19.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., p. 50 for tin, tantalum and tungsten and p. 110 for gold.
98 Ibid., p. 53 for tin, tantalum and tungsten and pp. 109–110 for gold.
99 oecd Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, p. 68, Section I(1).
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recommendations on how to reach compliance with the Guidelines.100 Gen-
erally, a decision of non-compliance should be followed-up by the respective 
ncp for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the recommenda-
tions by the corporation.101 All reports and statements are furthermore to be 
made publicly available.102 However, the ncps are not in a position to impose 
sanctions on corporations in situations of non-compliance. The question can 
be raised whether the publication of the results of the ncp procedure itself 
qualifies as a sanction. Of course, a statement of non-compliance reflects bad-
ly on the image of a corporation. The answer to the question of whether this 
should qualify as a sanction in itself largely depends on the dependence of the 
corporation on public opinion.
Other forms of external monitoring include the UN Sanctions Committee 
for the DR Congo and domestic legislation adopted for the purpose of imple-
menting the oecd Guidance. As regards the first, corporations sourcing from 
or operating in the DR Congo are under an obligation to exercise due diligence 
in accordance with the five steps set out in the oecd Guidance. A failure to 
respect this obligation may be used by the Sanctions Committee as a relevant 
factor in determining to place a corporation on the UN sanctions list.103 In 
this way, the UN Sanctions Committee indirectly plays a role in monitoring 
compliance with the oecd Guidance. Nonetheless, the relationship is very in-
direct and, moreover, geographically limited. As regards domestic legislation, 
reference can be made to the US Dodd Frank Act and the European Conflict 
Minerals Regulation.104 Both instruments prescribe corporations to follow 
the oecd standards, albeit the requirements set out in the Dodd Frank Act 
are restricted to corporations sourcing from the African Great Lakes Region. 
In terms of accountability, their mechanisms differ to a great extent. Where-
as the US Dodd Frank Act focuses on reporting obligations for corporations 
(‘giving account’),105 the emphasis of the EU Regulation is more on verifying 
100 Ibid., p. 72, Section C.
101 Ibid., pp. 84–85.
102 Ibid.
103 unsc Resolution 1952, para. 9.
104 See Dodd Frank Act, Section 1502 and EU Regulation 2017/821.
105 See Dodd Frank Act, Section 1502. For an assessment of the Dodd Frank Act and a com-
parison with the EU Regulation (in Dutch), see Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, ‘Internationale 
Instellingen en de Aanpak van Conflictgrondstoffen’ in Heleen de Coninck et al. (eds.), 
Rood-groene Politiek voor de 21e Eeuw: Een Pact Tussen Generaties (Amsterdam: Van Gen-
nep, 2017), pp. 167–184.
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compliance ex post and imposing sanctions for non-compliance (‘holding to 
account’).106
We should therefore distinguish between accountability within the frame-
work of the oecd Guidance, on the one hand, and by external mechanisms, on 
the other hand. Accountability within the oecd Guidance primarily covers the 
first two constitutive elements of accountability as set out in the previous sub-
section. It encompasses an obligation to give account, which is reflected in the 
transparency requirements. Similarly to the Kimberley Process, transparency 
is however primarily used as a tool to ensure the effectiveness of the system, 
in other words to ensure compliance. The oecd Guidance further includes 
monitoring mechanisms as a means to assess compliance with the standards, 
but these mechanisms do not equally apply to the various corporations in the 
supply chain. It is notable that downstream corporations are largely exempted 
from the auditing requirements, which is an indication that the primary pur-
pose of these requirements is to improve implementation. Nevertheless, the 
publication of the audit reports also ensures a degree of accountability. Finally, 
the near absence of sanction mechanisms in the oecd framework reinforces 
the idea that the primary purpose of the accountability requirements is to im-
prove compliance rather than to hold actors accountable for non-compliance. 
In this sense, external accountability mechanisms may play an important com-
plementary function, notably through the imposition of sanctions.
5 Concluding Remarks
This article compared two non-binding initiatives, which aim at promoting re-
sponsible minerals trade, and assessed their contribution to achieving target 
16.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals. By way of a reminder, target 16.6 
sees to creating ‘effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all lev-
els’ for the purpose of achieving sustainable development.
A central issue that was discussed in this article is how the two initiatives 
construe transparency and accountability. This issue was approached by ref-
erence to the following three questions: a) to what extent do the initiatives 
require actors to make information available and to whom (both as an aspect 
of transparency proper and as a first component of accountability)?; b) to 
what extent have mechanisms been established to verify compliance (second 
component of accountability)?; and c) to what extent have mechanisms been 
106 EU Regulation 2017/821, Articles 11 and 16.
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created to impose sanctions in case of violation of the standards (third com-
ponent of accountability)?
As regards the first question, it can be concluded from the analysis that 
the transparency requirements within these instruments serve two inter-
related purposes. The first purpose is to improve the knowledge base for 
decision-making, thereby ensuring the proper functioning of these systems. 
Examples include the sharing of information on the origin of minerals between 
participants in both systems. The second purpose is to enhance compliance 
with the standards amongst the parties. Some of these requirements have a 
strong internal focus: examples include the domestic implementation report-
ing requirements between participants in the kpcs and the internal reporting 
structures that corporations are to establish pursuant to the oecd Guidance. 
However, both instruments also provide for the disclosure of information to 
the general public. The kpcs scheme provides for the disclosure of the annual 
reports on domestic implementation as well as the diamond statistics, in as far 
as this would not harm commercial interests. Within the oecd Guidance, the 
vertical dimension of transparency is integrated in the requirement for corpo-
rations to publish their due diligence policy in their annual reports, thereby 
permitting a degree of public scrutiny. This indicates that transparency within 
these two instruments is construed both as a form of transparency proper and 
as an aspect of ‘giving account’.
Another purpose of transparency proper as identified in section 2, namely 
to enhance the inclusiveness of decision-making, is not addressed by the trans-
parency requirements. However, a distinction should be made here between 
the requirements formulated for the parties implementing the instruments 
and the instruments themselves. Most importantly, notwithstanding the for-
mal distinction made in the kpcs between participants (States) and observers 
(civil society and the private sector), the latter play an important role in day-
to-day decision-making as members of kpcs committees and working groups. 
In addition, these committees and working groups also seek to involve external 
stakeholders (such as artisanal miners) in their decision-making. Likewise, the 
oecd Guidance has been developed with input from a variety of stakeholders. 
Whereas parties implementing the instruments are therefore not required to 
enhance inclusiveness in their decision-making processes, it is reflected in the 
internal structures of the initiatives themselves.
The second component of accountability, namely verifying compliance, is 
furthermore well developed through the accountability requirements in these 
initiatives. The kpcs, for example, contains mechanisms (review visits and re-
view missions) to verify compliance with the minimum standards. The oecd 
Guidance on its part subjects specific corporations to auditing requirements.
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The third and last component of accountability, namely the possibility of 
imposing sanctions for violation of the standards, is less developed in these 
initiatives. Where the kpcs allows for the suspension of participants as an ul-
timum remedium, corporate performance under the oecd Guidance is moni-
tored by the ncps. However, the ncps do not have the authority to impose 
sanctions. In this sense, the oecd Guidance is hence largely dependent on 
external mechanisms, such as domestic legislation.
It is important to underline that target 16.6 specifically refers to institutions, 
as clarified in the introduction. A final question that deserves attention is to 
what extent the transparency and accountability requirements formulated by 
the two initiatives have an effect on institutions. As regards transparency, the 
kpcs requirements relating to inter alia the publication of diamond statistics 
would in principle have an effect on the transparency of State institutions 
which could go beyond the initiative’s limited objective of preventing trade in 
rough diamonds that are used as a means to finance rebellions. After all, this 
type of information is also important for the purpose of determining a State’s 
contribution to the global diamond trade. Likewise, the transparency require-
ments formulated by the oecd Guidance have an effect on the transparency of 
corporate structures, especially where these relate to introducing transparency 
requirements into internal corporate systems.
The question of whether the two initiatives contribute to creating account-
able institutions is more difficult to answer. The transparency requirements 
and monitoring mechanisms certainly create the conditions for holding actors 
accountable, but the limited possibilities offered by the initiatives to impose 
sanctions as well as the general aims of these mechanisms, precludes a posi-
tive answer to this question. Perhaps one could say that the initiatives create 
accountable institutions to the extent that they create mechanisms which 
pressure actors to give account of their policies as well as mechanisms that 
allow the verification of the information provided by these actors. Whether 
this is sufficient to create true accountability is open to debate.107
By way of conclusion, it must be emphasized that, notwithstanding their 
flaws and limitations, both initiatives play an important role in making the 
minerals trade more responsible. Their conception of transparency may be 
narrow and their operationalization of accountability incomplete, but both 
107 Levon Epremian, Païvi Lujala and Carl Bruch, ‘High-Value Natural Resources and Trans-
parency: Accounting for Revenues and Governance’ in William R. Thompson (ed.), 
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, October 2016, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/
documents/high-value_natural_resources_and_transparencyoxford_2016.pdf, accessed 21 
February 2019.
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initiatives have the potential to contribute to the sustainable development 
of developing countries which are largely dependent on minerals. Because of 
their flexibility, the instruments can be easily adapted to accommodate chang-
ing circumstances, and they are indeed constantly evolving. In this way, they 
contribute to the broader setting which Goal 16 envisages, namely to promote 
peaceful societies for sustainable development.
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